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SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURE OF THE EU 
MARK DAWSON & FLORIS DE WITTE
∗
 
INTRODUCTION 
This article discusses the threat of authoritarian liberalism by looking at the constitutional future of the 
EU. It does not seek to assess how ‘bad’ authoritarian liberalism is, but how ‘real’ its emergence is. In a 
previous article, we have argued that in its response to the Euro-crisis, the Union risks destabilizing its 
commitment to the values of individual and collective self-determination, which are indispensable for its 
legitimacy (section 1).
1
 In this article, we analyse three leading proposals for the re-design and 
deepening of the European Union that are currently being discussed, and analyse to what extent these 
proposals address the challenges raised by the specter of authoritarian liberalism, and to what extent 
they attempt to protect the values of political self-determination that serve to bolster the EU’s long-
term legitimacy and stability.   
The first proposal, which seems to find most support in Europe’s political elite, can best be described as 
a Europe based on executive federalism, whereby salient choices are made by the executives of (some 
of) the Member States, and enforced by a depoliticized Commission. This model’s strong pre-definition 
of the policies the Union should pursue, sidelining of representative institutions and inability to allow for 
political equality between states makes executive federalism largely a continuation of the de-stabilising 
reforms of the crisis years (section 2). The second option is one of differentiated integration, whereby 
the relationship between the Member States is to be rewritten, allowing for much further integration 
for the Euro-zone (section 3). While differentiated integration would seem to offer efficiency 
advantages, it fails to deal with the need for trade-offs between the substantive goals pursued by Euro-
zone states and other EU members. The third and seemingly most ambitious proposal suggest that we 
should democratize the Union decision-making process. This third route can best be captured by the 
term ‘political union light’, as, despite its attempts to democratise the EU’s policy choices, its aim is not 
to create a true political union (one that asks its citizens how they want to live their lives) but rather an 
EU with sufficient legitimacy to force through (rather than debate) the apparently necessary economic 
restructuring and social retrenchment needed for the euro-zone to survive (section 4).  
In keeping with the debate on authoritarian liberalism to which this special issue is devoted, what these 
proposals carry in common is a resolve to limit, to varying degrees, serious political questioning of the 
EU’s existing economic and political order. Their common presumption is that significant changes to the 
Union’s set-up are necessary in order for the Union to meet its objectives, or at least to solve the 
structural problems identified in their pursuit. At the same time, they do not envisage the EU’s 
                                                          
∗
 Mark Dawson is Professor of European Law and Governance at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin. Floris 
de Witte is Assistant Professor in the Law Department of the London School of Economics and Political Science. 
With many thanks to Elise Muir, Alexander Somek and Christian Joerges, as well as the participants to the 
workshop on ‘The Euro-crisis and the Post-Communist ‘Return to Europe’: Will Europe finally unite?’ organized by 
CeLAPA. The usual disclaimer applies.  
1
 Mark Dawson & Floris de Witte, ‘Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro-crisis’, (2013) 76 The Modern 
Law Review 5, 817  
 2
objectives themselves as open to political scrutiny. In this sense, as Michael Wilkinson has observed, 
many of the proposals to reform the EU share authoritarian liberalism’s concealment of any conflict 
between democratic self-determination and the functional necessities of the market. Democratic reform 
– where pursued – is forwarded as a means to embed, rather than contest, the EU’s functional and 
economic goals. In order to side-step these pitfalls of authoritarian liberalism, it is argued, we must 
focus our attention on inverting this path-dependency: changes to the way in which the Union works 
should serve to question its future direction or objectives; not to set them in stone.
2
 A true commitment 
to self-determination presupposes a normative, institutional and legal structure for the EU able to 
contest the EU’s economic and political goals.  
 
1. CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE AND ITS DISINTEGRATION DURING THE EURO-CRISIS 
In a previous article, we argued that the stability and legitimacy of the Union has been undermined by 
the Member States’ responses to the Euro-crisis.
3
 We argued, in general terms, that any defensible form 
of European integration must be able to forward the project of individual and collective self-
determination. This centrality of self-determination forms the normative core of the idea of 
constitutional balance, which is further substantiated, within the Treaties, in three different domains. 
First, it finds expression in the substantive balance between what the EU can do and what Member 
States should do. As a consequence, the EU Treaties have often sought to insulate the capacity of 
citizens to decide on salient policy questions (such as redistributive policies) at the national level. The 
Union’s responses to the Euro-crisis have undermined this idea of substantive balance by increasingly 
making in-roads in Member State autonomy in redistributive, fiscal and budgetary matters. This is most 
dramatically visible, of course, in the conditionality criteria that debtor states must accept in return for 
financial support.
4
  
Second, the commitment to self-determination is expressed in institutional terms by linking the different 
interests represented by different European institutions – in order to ensure that the diverse views of 
citizens find expression in the decision making process. The response to the crisis has equally 
undermined the concept of institutional balance, by way of a power shift towards executive dominance. 
Agenda-setting has moved from the Commission to the European Council – with the former increasingly 
serving a monitoring role in ensuring compliance with the latter’s decisions.
5
 Finally, the idea of self-
determination is expressed in spatial terms, by ensuring equality between Member States regardless of 
size, in order to protect the spaces for self-determination as they exist on the national level. The Union’s 
response to the crisis has equally subverted this concept. Two of the most notable examples are the 
requirement that all Member States agree to Treaty amendments, which has been bypassed by way of 
the use of international law for the ESM and Fiscal Compact; and voting rights in the ESM, which reflects 
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 3
the Member States’ respective financial contributions rather than their status as equal and sovereign 
political spaces.
6
 Overall, we argued, these shifts significantly undermine the capacity of the EU to 
produce stable and legitimate norms – pushing it towards a model unable to reproduce the mechanisms 
of individual and political self-determination found at the national level.7  
It might be argued that rebalancing of the EU was inevitable after the Euro-crisis. The transfer of powers 
to the Union level strongly suggests that the EU’s institutional settlement and its division of decision-
making power ought to be re-aligned. In the last few years, the first proposals outlining a new 
constitutional balance for the post-emergency Europe have begun to emerge. In this article, we aim to 
use our conceptual framework to scrutinise these proposals. How can the EU alter its functional and 
normative ambitions yet still maintain some semblance of the overarching structural principles that it 
carried prior to the crisis? And to what extent are principles of self-determination reflected in the 
current academic and institutional debate?   
 
2. PROPOSAL I: EXECUTIVE FEDERALISM 
The first proposal for the future of Europe – executive federalism – carries the most support from the 
existing EU institutions. At the same time, its de-politicised definition of the goals the EU integration 
project should pursue, as well as its restriction of policy-making to a closed circle of executive actors, 
places it in clear conflict with any notion of the EU as a project aimed at realizing political self-
determination.  
The report of the ‘4 Presidents’ issued by the heads of the main institutions in December 2012 gives a 
good indication of how a model of executive federalism could emerge in the coming decade.
8
 The very 
authorship of the report gives a clear indication of who should be the central actors under this model. 
The report is authored by the Presidents of the European Council, the Euro-group, the Commission and 
the ECB. Their vision is to develop a ‘genuine economic and monetary Union’ guided by the need to 
establish sound and balanced management of public finances.  
Substantively, the three guiding reforms demanded are the need to create a common system of fiscal 
surveillance to monitor national budgets, a common mechanism for the supervision and resolution of 
EU banks, and finally independent EU fiscal capacity, able to limit financial contagion either of sovereign 
debt (eg through the funding provided via the European Stability Mechanism) or of private debt (held by 
failing euro-zone banks).
9
 
                                                          
6
 Dawson & De Witte, n 1 supra, at 836-842. 
7
 See, among others, Michael Wilkinson, ‘The Specter of Authoritarian Liberalism: Reflections on the Constitutional 
Crisis of the European Union’, (2013) 14 German Law Journal, 527.  
8
 ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’, Report of the 4 Presidents, 5 December 2012. Available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/134069.pdf. 
9
 See timetable of the 4 Presidents’ Report, n 8 supra, at 18. 
 4
Institutionally, these mechanisms follow the model of a triad executive (following the authorship of the 
report). Along the first track, the Commission is the dominant actor. The Commission’s ability to 
interfere unencumbered into national budgetary processes is strengthened by a number of aspects of 
the new coordination regime, from the creation of a ‘reversed qualified majority’ voting rule under the 
excessive deficit (EDP) and macro-economic imbalances (MIP) procedures (insulating its 
recommendations from veto) to its heightened ability to recommend alterations to national budgets 
prior to their entry into force under the ‘two pack’.
10
 
On the second, banking track, the central actor is the ECB. Under the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
Regulation, the ECB (and national banking authorities) are to have direct authority, with the assistance 
of a new European Banking Authority, to directly supervise and implement a common rule book for all 
euro-zone banks with assets of over 30 billion.
11
 On the third, fiscal capacity track, the central executive 
is national governments under the euro-group, ECOFIN and European Council. In the ESM governing 
board, only national governments may vote, with the Commission and ECB present as non-voting 
members.
12
 
Dis-enfranchisement of other branches of government is apparent along all three tracks.
13
 The European 
Parliament has no role under the ESM Treaty and cannot of course interfere with the decisions of the 
Central Bank. The Directive setting up the Single Supervisory Mechanism creates no powers or duties for 
the EP bar the traditional ability of that institution to be informed of the activities of EU agencies. 
Finally, the regime for economic coordination gives no concrete powers for the EP to co-adopt 
recommendations under new coordination procedures.
14
 
The rationale for executive control running through these proposals is, on its face, clear. Only executives 
and governments carry the competence, speed, credibility and legitimacy to mandate and direct 
significant EU intervention in core state powers such as fiscal policy. To channel such measures through 
the Union’s traditional legislative procedures would constitute a delegation of power to bodies (such as 
the EP) which lack the levels of public trust required to distribute significant public resources and 
interfere in sensitive areas of national policy.  
The ways in which such a model contravenes principles of self-determination are myriad. To begin at a 
substantive level, self-determination implies that salient political questions are decided in forums 
politically accountable to citizens. Traditionally, this was achieved by a separation of national and EU 
goals, with EU policy explicitly cordoned off from sensitive policy issues. A more modern conception 
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would imply balancing substantive priorities not through the separation, but the open contestation of 
EU policy. The ability of EU policy to achieve individual and political self-determination is secured this 
way not through the defence of national sovereignty but through the ability of both individuals and 
states to pursue their goals in a common European political process.  
By contrast, executive federalism’s focus on budgetary stability implies a strong functional pre-definition 
of the goals of substantive reform and institutional innovation.
15
 Under the MIP and EIP procedures – as 
well as the Fiscal Compact - national economies are coordinated with a particular overarching and 
defined goal in mind – ensuring sound and sustainable public finances. The formulation of European 
budgetary policy contained in Art. 119(3) TFEU – that national budgets should adhere to the guiding 
principles of ‘stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of 
payments’ - is thus continually repeated in the legislation establishing a regime of EU fiscal 
surveillance.
16
 Austerity and fiscal discipline – and in the case of states receiving financial assistance, 
severe downward pressure on the social state - are forwarded as the only achievable means of 
delivering sound budgets in spite of significant academic and public disagreement on how a sustainable 
EMU can be achieved.  
In keeping with the model of authoritarian liberalism, law is often used in this context to repress political 
conflict. Examples of this include the Fiscal Compact’s demand on states to place balanced budget rules 
in national rules of a ‘permanent, preferably constitutional’ character, as well as the delegation of 
decision-making authority to actors such as the ECB whose actions are intentionally insulated from 
political challenge. From the perspective of self-determination, executive federalism seems to restrict 
rather than open-up the channels through which the substantive goals of integration can be contested.  
The challenges executive federalism poses at an institutional level are equally pressing. As already 
discussed, while both the 6 and 2 packs were passed with the consent of the European Parliament, they 
mandate a decision-making process in which the parliamentary estate is given highly circumscribed 
rights. Such an exclusion of the parliamentary branch carries close affinities with what Alexander Somek 
has described as ‘authoritarian constitutionalism’; a form of constitutionalism which ‘accepts structures 
of governance that contain most of the features of constitutional democracy with the noteworthy 
exception of (parliamentary) democracy itself’.17 
In terms of the spatial dimension, executive federalism fares little better. Political self-determination 
also implies some conception of political equality: in the past this has been defined by the need to avoid 
hegemony of larger over small Member States. Executive federalism seems simply to introduce a further 
vital dividing line in EU policy-making: between states with and without a positive fiscal condition. While 
states retain their formal equality, the level of sovereignty to which a state is entitled is increasingly 
conditional, post-crisis, upon their fiscal health.  
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While, before the crisis, states with excessive government deficits could already be subject to additional 
obligations and penalties, the executive federalism model takes this imbalance much further, 
introducing a significant fragmentation of obligations. The revised EDP, for example, establishes 
different obligations depending on whether states carry a deficit within their ‘Medium Term Budgetary 
Objective’ (MBTO). For states outwith this target, not only are particular policy courses ruled out (eg to 
reduce revenues through cuts in taxation without corresponding spending reductions)
18
, but a new 
regime of budgetary and economic partnership co-agreed by the Council and Commission is established 
(an obligation inapplicable to other states).
19
 When combined with the even more prescriptive 
interventions applicable to states currently receiving Troika funding, revised economic governance 
procedures create a regime of layered obligations with heightened levels of intervention depending on a 
state’s ability to meet fiscal targets. 
If self-determination implies a level of political equality between citizens regardless of their state of 
citizenship, this layering creates an asymmetry between those states whose fiscal performance insulates 
them from budgetary scrutiny and those whose budgetary, and hence political, autonomy is limited by 
their insolvency. Executive federalism’s model of an ever-more harmonized economic policy, combined 
with a closed circle of decisive policy actors, seems in tension with a constitution for the EU able to tie 
the direction of EU policy-making to the desires of Europe’s citizenry.  
 
3. PROPOSAL II: DIFFERENTIATED INTEGRATION 
A second possibility - designed to foster not uniformity but differentiation in the EU’s legal and political 
order – ought to be considered as a further alternative. While this model seems to offer a way-out of 
the dilemma of building a more advanced EU project in the face of significant domestic opposition, in 
doing so, it may in fact re-enforce the tendencies of de-politicisation, executive control and political 
inequality apparent in the first proposal. 
While ‘differentiated integration’ does not appear in the literature as a single approach, the common 
core of the idea is expressed by Giandomenico Majone through his conception of EU integration as a 
project which is turning from a ‘collective’ to a ‘club’ good.20 The collective good of integration is 
embodied by Jean Monnet’s original ideal of an ever closer Union among the peoples of Europe. 
Integration could deliver significant collective goals – of peace, freedom and prosperity – only if Member 
States were willing to agree to a permanent but limited surrender of their sovereignty across a limited 
number of fields. That surrender was justified so long as all members of the club were able to benefit 
equally from the collective goods thereby produced, and to trust the common institutions needed to 
enforce collective decisions. 
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For Majone, the crisis challenges both of these assumptions. The very adoption of the euro – with some 
states ‘in’ and others ‘out’ - implies significant disagreement about the range of collective goods the EU 
should deliver.
21
 At the same time, the move of the euro zone towards elements of re-distributive 
politics also questions the assumption that all will benefit equally from EU policies. Finally, the 
institutional hegemon – the European Commission – lacks the level of trust, authority and respect 
required to enforce collective decisions on Member States in the fiscal field. 
Integration – in the euro-zone at least – should thus, according to Majone, be conceived of as a ‘club’ 
good. Rather than being open to all, club goods are available only to those who contribute to, and share 
the costs of, their realization.
22
 Clearly this implies a quite different model of integration, with states 
participating in EU integration not on the basis of an open-ended commitment to trans-national 
cooperation but to achieve concrete goals in particular domains. These goals themselves – and not the 
institutions formed to deliver them – will therefore determine the speed and nature of integration.  
In practice, two different routes to ‘club governance’ present themselves: one based on a ‘two-speed’ 
Europe and the other ‘multi-speed’.
23
 The two–speed approach implies a division between a core of 
(most likely euro-zone) states who wish to move forward with the integration process in a number of 
areas, and a periphery which resists such sovereignty transfers.
24
 The ‘multi-speed’ model suggests a 
more fragmented approach. Assuming that even euro-zone states may have different policy 
preferences, multi-speed integration implies concentric and overlapping circles of integration. While 
some Member States may converge around economic coordination, other states may agree to 
sovereignty transfer on defence cooperation, environmental protection or a host of other areas. 
Both of these approaches present significant decision-making advantages. Removed of the need to 
establish policies that can win the support of a large proportion of 28 Member States, differentiated 
integration provides obvious efficiency gains.
25
 The possibility of avoiding a complicated legislative 
process, replete with vetoes and in-transparent side-payments to recalcitrant Member States, may drive 
the desire to narrow down the number of actors involved in decision-making.
26
 This may be particularly 
important in policy areas where rapid and changing regulatory interventions are needed.  
From the perspective of self-determination, however, differentiated integration seems to violate core 
elements. To begin with self-determination at a substantive level, on its face differentiated integration 
seems to allow Member States the freedom to pursue through integration any policy goal of their own 
choosing. This may, however, be an illusory freedom. This refers to a common critique of ‘enhanced 
cooperation’ in the context of the existing Treaties
27
 - the successful coordination of one particular ‘club 
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good’ might have constraining effects on other ‘clubs’. In this sense, achieving the goals of the ‘core’ 
might require altering the rules and policies of the periphery (or vice versa). 
The heart of this point relates to the internal market. To use the ‘two-speed’ Europe example, a core 
claim of advocates of this approach is that further integration in the euro-zone can be achieved 
alongside the equal development of a robust internal market (that would remain a ‘collective good’, 
equally accessible by members and non-members of the euro-zone alike).
28
 A practical example can 
illustrate the difficulties of sustaining this position. One such example is the Financial Transaction Tax 
(FTT), a measure led by 11 Member States seeking to tax ‘risky’ fiscal transactions.29 Such a measure – 
designed to penalize market behavior deemed at the core of the financial crisis – is surely among the 
types of measures a ‘core Europe’ could pursue. 
Clearly, however, such a measure has implications for the ability of the EU to deliver ‘collective goods’ 
(such as the internal market) as well.
30
 This spill-over capacity was laid bare in a leaked opinion of the 
Council legal service, following the decision of the UK government to challenge the FTT directive before 
the Court of Justice.
31
 Whereas transactions between participating states would be subject to a fixed set 
of rules, applicable rates of taxation in non-participating states would vary. Individuals entering into 
financial transactions with non-participating states would face considerable legal uncertainty as to the 
rate applicable and even over whether the duty to impose the tax would be implemented at all. By 
acting as an impediment to the free movement of capital
32
, efforts to realize the ‘club good’ of a more 
regulated market were likely to impinge on the ‘collective good’ of free trans-national movement. For 
this reason, the FTT did not, in the Council’s view, respect the EU Treaties.
33
 
Looking beyond this example to other possible fields (banking, taxation etc.), the establishment of ever 
greater disparities between the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’ is likely to clash with one of the internal 
market’s core goals: the elimination of disparities in national rules, likely to impede a Europe-wide 
economic area.
34
 If self-determination implies that different ‘clubs’ should be able to realize policy goals 
of their own choosing, this principle is questioned by the significant externalities differentiated 
integration creates. 
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Finally, differentiated integration also presents problems in relation to other elements of self-
determination. Institutionally, many of these problems have already been discussed elsewhere.
35
 It is 
unclear, for example, how institutions should act and decide when objectives and tasks for the 
fulfillment of ‘club goods’ conflict with steps needed to safeguard the policies of the Union as a whole. A 
more pressing problem, however, may relate to spatial balance. From the perspective of self-
determination, clubs can be normatively defended only if states are free and equal as regards their 
decisions either to enter into clubs or leave them. The experience of differentiated integration in the 
euro-zone questions this assumption. To take one example, to what extent were states like Portugal, 
Greece and Ireland free to reject participation in the Fiscal Compact as one example of a differentiated 
arrangement? Ratification of the Treaty was a condition for access to EU bail-out funding, effectively 
coercing these states into ‘joining the club’. 
Such a centrifugal effect could also occur at an informal level. The rush of even non-euro states to ratify 
the Fiscal Compact could be seen as their reaction to a fear that they would be excluded from future 
decision-making if they did not follow provisions negotiated by the smaller euro group. The ‘spatial’ 
danger here is that differentiated integration allows a core of larger or more prosperous states to create 
rules and decisions, which others must later apply and follow.
36
 Here, the institutional and spatial 
dimensions inter-relate – the reluctance of states such as the UK and Poland for example, to allow for an 
official euro-group
37
, can easily be seen as reflecting a fear that such a group will end up voting en bloc 
in ECOFIN, thus turning the agenda of the ‘club’ into that of the Union as a whole. Inequalities of power 
between states – already a problem in the existing Union – could be exacerbated by a renewed focus on 
a ‘core’ (where such states are yet more predominant).  
Substantively, institutionally and spatially, differentiated integration – like the model of executive 
federalism – seems to preclude the commitment of self-determination to a European political process in 
which different citizens and states have open and equal access to the political process.  
 
4. PROPOSAL III: POLITICAL UNION ‘LIGHT’  
The third and seemingly most ambitious proposal suggest that we should democratize the Union 
institutions. The proponents of this approach do not challenge the ‘fact’ that economic and budgetary 
decisions must be centralized in response to the crisis, but submit that the process of economic 
decision-making in the EU should be democratized. While these proposals have much to commend 
them, they fall far short of a transnational space for self-determination. Reflecting authoritarian 
liberalism’s concealment of democratic choice, democratic institutions are largely utilized under this 
model to better embed, rather than to contest, the existing substantive and economic order.  
                                                          
35
 B. de Witte, ‘Another Legal Monster? An EUI Debate on the Fiscal Compact Treaty’ (2012) EUI Working Papers 
(Law) 9 at 7. 
36
 See C. Jensen and J. Slapin, ‘Institutional Hokey-Pokey: The Politics of Multi-Speed Integration in Europe’, (2012) 
19 Journal of European Public Policy 6, 799. 
37
 See EU Observer, ‘Poland Renews Attacks on Euro-zone-only Summits’, (19.01.2012). Available at: 
http://euobserver.com/economic/114945. 
 10 
The main proponents of this third option, such as Maduro
38
 and Kumm,
39
 develop their proposals from a 
similar starting point. They see two problems with the current set-up of the post-crisis EU. First, the 
divisive choices made in the economic governance of the EU can no longer be solely justified by reliance 
on the ‘outputs’ of financial and economic stability but must be supplemented with ‘input’ legitimacy.40 
Secondly, the increasing reliance on national actors to represent citizens’ desires in the economic 
governance of the Union creates significant democratic externalities.
41
 In order to overcome these two 
problems, Europe requires political union at a level beyond the state.   
For Maduro and Kumm, such a Union must begin with substantive answers to the current crisis. The 
crisis embodies the need to establish an ‘economic justice Union’
42
 in which the costs and benefits of 
integration are equitably shared.
43
 In order to guarantee this, Maduro and Kumm suggest three broad 
changes. First, the Union needs an increased budget, “raised from taxes or levies that burdens actors 
and transactions that are profiting financially from the internal market”.
44
 Second, the Union’s resources 
should be used to secure the “domestic institutional reforms” needed to further integration objectives 
(eg increasing “academic mobility and internationalization of faculty and student bodies”).
45
 Third, the 
Union needs “a strengthened political authority if it is to become a legitimate and accountable 
democratic authority”,
46
 in particular since “under the Fiscal Compact, the Six-Pack and to some extent 
even the ESM, the Commission gains considerable powers to intervene in the budgetary processes of 
Member States”.
47
 Like Maduro, Kumm argues that for new powers to “be exercised effectively and 
legitimately, the Commission must be able to rely on the kind of legitimacy that comes with direct link to 
the outcome of European elections”.
48
 In short, these proposals suggest a new method for Union-wide 
redistribution – with identified contributors and recipients – to be administered by a Commission whose 
president is elected via the European Parliament. 
When assessed from the perspective of the capacity for self-determination, the proposals by Maduro 
and Kumm are problematic in so far as they call for a democratization of the Commission, but not for a 
democratization of the Union. In substantive terms, such a Union does not allow citizens to be in charge 
of the question that is at the core of any political project: ‘in what kind of society do I want to live?’49 
                                                          
38
 M. Poiares Maduro, ‘A New Governance for the European Union and the Euro: Democracy and Justice’, (2012) 
11 RSCAS Policy Papers. 
39
 M. Kumm, ‘What Kind of a Constitutional Crisis is Europe In and What Should Be Done About it?’, (2013) WZB 
Discussion Paper SP IV, 2013-801. 
40
 F. Scharpf, ‘Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area’, in: O. Cramme & S. Hobolt (eds.), ‘Democratic 
Politics in a European Union under Stress’ (Oxford University Press, 2014), at 57. 
41
 In particular, Maduro, n 38 supra, at 3. Kumm’s position is drawn out in M. Kumm, ‘Rebel without a Good Cause: 
Karlsruhe’s Misguided Attempts to Draw the CJEU into a Game of “Chicken” and What the CJEU Might do About it’ 
(2014) 15 German Law Journal. See also Scharpf, ibid.  
42
 Kumm, n 39 supra, at 17. 
43
 Maduro, n 38 supra, at 10. 
44
 Kumm, n 39 supra, at 17; see Maduro, supra, at 17. 
45
 Maduro, n 38 supra, at 18. 
46
 Maduro, n 38 supra, at 18; Kumm, supra, at 19. 
47
 Kumm, n 39 supra, at 19; Maduro, supra, at 18. 
48
 Kumm, n 39 supra, at 19; Maduro, n 38 supra, at 18-19. 
49
 Somek, n 15 supra at 561. 
 11 
Under these proposals, the economic choices that appear ‘necessary’ are still made by the Member 
State executives and the ECB, whether through international agreements, Treaty revisions, voting in the 
EDP or MIP procedures, or monetary policy. Instead, it is the enforcement of such choices in the hands 
of the Commission, which is to be ‘democratised’. Institutionally, the most democratic institution in 
political union ‘light’, in other words, is entrusted with technical tasks in the field of economic 
governance (of implementing fiscal rules) but not with political tasks (ie of determining what ought to 
constitute the EU’s economic objectives). The purpose of democratization is not political choice ie 
allowing Europeans to change the conditions of government but political legitimacy ie to ensure the 
smooth enforcement of executive decisions and policies.
50
  
In consequence, both proposals appear very functional in nature. Maduro perhaps puts it best: 
“whatever our view on the benefits and costs of constitutionalizing fiscal discipline, two things are clear 
in the current EU context: this discipline is a necessity, (..) but this discipline is also insufficient to 
address the current crisis”.
51
 Tuori and Tuori have recently argued that this path-dependence – 
favouring austerity, supply-side reforms, labour flexibility and liberalization – is part of the macro-
economic constitution introduced in the Treaties in 1992.52 Echoing the model of authoritarian 
liberalism identified by Heller, the basic principles of the macro-economic constitution required divisive 
social and redistributive choices that were shielded from political contestation. In Tuori and Tuori’s 
narrative, it is the basic choices that underlay the structure of EMU – from the focus on price stability to 
the prohibition on monetary financing – that now cause rapid convergence around a liberal economic 
model. What now appears ‘without alternative’ is thus only so given the original political choice on how 
EMU ought to be structured. This sentiment has been echoed by many scholars.
53
 A true political union 
would seem to demand much more ie a substantive and institutional framework whereby European 
citizens are able to contest the core principles that shape their lives.
54
 As Bartolini has put it: 
“institutional democratization is, in principle, easy to achieve; but any institutional democratization 
without political structuring is potentially catastrophic, and political structures cannot be created 
without important advances in systems building.”
55
 
Finally, the proposals by Maduro and Kumm do not explicitly broach the spatial question of political 
equality in Europe. Arguably, it does little to change the EU’s spatial balance for the better. If spatial 
balance is understood as equality between European citizens, as the indirect election of the Commission 
president would suggest, it fails for the reasons argued above: it does not allow citizens to control the 
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substantive policy directions of the EU.
56
 If spatial balance is understood as equality between the 
Member States, the proposals do not change much: it appears that the problem of hegemonic power 
within the European Council, as identified above, remains unchallenged. These problems make the 
option of ‘political union light’ unappealing from the perspective of the capacity of the citizen to engage 
in the process of polity construction. Not only is the citizen sidelined from deciding the type of life that 
she is allowed to live, but this very fact may be obscured by a façade of democratic institutions, electoral 
cycles and political choice. 
 
5. RE-FRAMING SELF-DETERMINATION IN EUROPE 
The three proposals mentioned above differ in their visions for the constitutional future of the EU. What 
they carry in common, however, is their founding premise: that ‘there is no alternative’ to significant 
further integration in fiscal, budgetary and social matters. While this observation may (or may not) be 
justified from an economic perspective, it fails to meet a basic demand of political self-determination – 
that government is conducted not just for but by the people ie that the goals of the political order are 
retrieved from the political process.  
To this extent, these proposals offer significant continuity with elements of the original design of the 
Treaties. The notion, for example, that the Treaties should ‘set in stone’ particular EU objectives – of 
price stability, market access, no assumption of debt, and other goals – suggests a long-standing use of 
EU law to limit conflict over the EU’s substantive goals.
57
 Certainly, there was a time where such a move 
may have been normatively justified. As illustrated by the concept with which this paper began – 
constitutional balance – the provision to the EU of defined tasks may be normatively justified where this 
ensures that political questions of high salience to citizens are deliberated and determined at the 
national level.  
Just as Heller observed in his own time in relation to the then German state, however, the substantive 
ambitions of the contemporary European project are far greater. The shift of the EU into re-distributive 
policies problematizes significantly the idea that law should seek to suppress political conflicts over how 
those policies are designed. A true political Union would involve not suppressing but channeling and 
promoting meaningful conflict over the EU’s substantive goals
58
, from the very need for a euro area to 
the level at which particular powers in Europe should be exercised. A true political Union in this sense 
would involve an EU constitutional framework that does not simply channel political authority but 
questions and re-frames it. 
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In a telling section of his piece, Heller underlines why Germany’s establishment may have sought an 
authoritarian basis for an otherwise ‘liberal’ economic order. ‘Of course’, he argues, ‘the German people 
would not tolerate for long this neoliberal state if it ruled in democratic forms.’
59
 A ‘liberal’ state, 
seeking to dismantle social protections, could prosper only if protected from democratic scrutiny. The 
EU’s placing of its economic governance behind a wall of legal protection, to be enforced by 
democratically unaccountable institutions, seems eerily reminiscent of this fear: that the existing 
substantive order could not survive democratic challenge.  It may be time to find out. 
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